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MINNESOTA DOES NOT NEED AN INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
HENRY HALLADAYt It
Members of both houses of the Minnesota Legislature have recently pro-
posed the establishment of an intermediate appellate court. In this Arti-
cle, Mr. Halladay discusses the reasons why an intermediate appellate
court is unnecessar and suggests alternatives to ease the conditions that
many cite toyiustift its existence. Mr. Halladay concludes that the crea-
tion of an intermediate court will increase the judicial bureaucracy of
Minnesota and add only more work, delay, and expense to the process of
judicial review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the nineteenth century, the people of Kansas ex-
perimented with an intermediate court of appeals to help their
"overburdened" supreme court with its administration of justice.
The appellate court's mandate was temporary, and in 1901 it was
allowed to expire because the year before the size of the state's
supreme court had been expanded by constitutional amendment
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from three to seven justices.' Ninety-five percent of the Kansas
bar supported that amendment; they were dissatisfied with the in-
termediate appellate court because they thought a properly orga-
nized and adequately staffed supreme court could do a more
effective job.
2
Kansas recently reestablished an intermediate appellate court,
3
but I agree with those early Kansas lawyers. Their concerns,
though voiced at the turn of the century, remain valid today. An
intermediate appellate court adds another level of judicial bureau-
cracy, which means another level of government and expense for
litigants and taxpayers.4 It is a level of bureaucratic muddle and
expense that makes me shudder and should not be assumed, at
least not until all other options have been fully and fairly tried.5 I
am not against the idea of changes in the present appellate system,
but I am totally opposed to the creation of an additional layer of
courts that is not absolutely necessary.
II. SIDE EFFECTS OF AN INTERMEDIATE COURT MAKE ITS
CREATION UNDESIRABLE
Supporters of an intermediate court of appeals in Minnesota
propose to amend article VI of the Minnesota Constitution, which
establishes our judicial system. 6 This article was last amended in
1956, 7 and was incorporated in the ministerial revision of 1974.8
Section one of article VI provides that "[t]he judicial power of
1. Comment, The Kansas Courts ofAppeals, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 378, 382 (1973).
2. Id
3. "On January 10, 1977, there shall be and is hereby established a court of record
which shall be known as the court of appeals." Act ofJuly 1, 1975, ch. 178, § 1, 1975 Kan.
Sess. Laws 519, 520 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3001 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
4. See R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 66
(1976).
5. See id at 67.
6. MINN. CONST. art. VI.
7. See 1957 Minn. Laws 5-8 (proclamation of adoption of amendment to article VI
of Minnesota Constitution).
8. See 1975 Minn. Laws XIII-XIV. It is somewhat ironic that from 1857 until 1956,
no constitutional amendment would have been necessary to empower the legislature to
create an intermediate court of appeals. The language of article VI, section 1 formerly
provided for the creation of "such other courts, inferior to the supreme court, as the legis-
lature may from time to time establish by a two-thirds vote." MINN. CONST. of 1857 art.
VI, § 1 (amended 1957). The change in phrasing may well have occurred inadvertently
when the article was amended to provide for an appointed rather than an elected clerk of
the supreme court. See Wolfram, Notes ftom a Study of the Caseload of the Minnesota Supreme
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the state is vested in a supreme court, a district court and such
other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction
inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish." Sec-
tion two gives the supreme court jurisdiction in remedial cases as
"prescribed by law" and "appellate jurisdiction in all cases."' 10
The proposed amendment" would add "court of appeals" to
the list of courts in section one of article VI and describe its juris-
diction in a revised section two.' 2 The amendment would not
change the number of justices serving on the supreme court, but it
would allow for an unlimited number of judges on the intermedi-
ate appellate bench.'3 Under the proposed amendment, the
supreme court would still have "remedial case" jurisdiction as pre-
scribed by the legislature and appellate jurisdiction in all cases,
but there would be added a new and populous court of appeals
with appellate jurisdiction over all lower courts and other appel-
late jurisdiction as prescribed by law.'
4
The principal problem for which this amendment is the puta-
tive panacea is the supposedly excessive workload that litigants
and their appeals have created for our supreme court, resulting in
delays or injustice in appellate decisions. In 1976, for example,
9. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
10. Id § 2. Section two of article VI provides:
The supreme court consists of one chief judge and not less than six nor more
than eight associate judges as the legislature may establish. It shall have original
jurisdiction in such remedial cases as are prescribed by law, and appellate juris-
diction in all cases, but there shall be no trial by jury in the supreme court.
As provided by law, judges of the district court may be assigned temporarily
to act as judges of the supreme court upon its request.
Id
11. H.F. 842, 72d Minn. Legis., 1981 Sess. (provisions of this proposal are virtually
identical to those of H.F. 632, 71st Minn. Legis., 1979 Sess.).
12. The proposed amendment would add the following provision to section two of
article VI:
The legislature may establish a court of appeals and provide by law for the
number of its judges, who shall not be judges of any other court, and its organi-
zation and for the manner of review of its decisions by the supreme court. The
court of appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction over all courts, except the
supreme court, and other appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
H.F. 842, 72d Minn. Legis., 1981 Sess. § 1, subd. 2.
13. See id. My discussion is confined to provisions of the proposed constitutional
amendment itself. I do note, however, that HF. 842 also contains certain proposed statu-
tory changes. One of these would reduce the size of the supreme court from nine to seven
judges, see id. § 14, and another would set the initial size of the intermediate appellate
bench at 21 judges and thereafter tie the number of judges to the number of appeals filed.
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911 cases were filed with the supreme court.15 Not counting cases
dismissed without decision, the court decided 483 cases on the
merits that year, an average of fifty-four per judge.16 The average
time from notice of appeal to decision was fifteen months. 1 7 More-
over, the general trend has been a yearly increase in the number of
filings,' 8 which forbodes yet more delay, even if all other factors
remain equal.
Proponents of an intermediate court of appeals, of course, think
that the way to avoid increasing delays in the appellate process is
to interpose another level of judges and their staffs between the
trial courts and the supreme court. Although not fully articulated
in the proposed amendment,' 9 creation of an appellate court is un-
doubtedly to be coupled with discretionary review of that court's
work product by the supreme court. Otherwise, if litigants losing
in the intermediate court could appeal as of right to the supreme
court, an additional tier of review would only add more work, de-
lay, and expense without economizing on anything.
We should be aware at the outset of some of the side effects of a
high degree of discretionary review. Presuming the high court ex-
ercises this discretion, it will have fewer cases to review. Among
those fewer cases will be a higher percentage of so-called "impor-
tant" ones. This will mean greater prestige for the court and its
members,20 but increasing prestige is hardly a good reasoti to add
a tier of bureaucracy.
Another related effect is a possible change in the court's percep-
tion of its role. Requiring litigants to petition for high court re-
view encourages the development of a more policy-oriented
judiciary. 2' Litigants attempting to cajole the court into hearing
their cases will emphasize not only that the intermediate court
missed the point, but also that the case presents opportunities for
15. See Marvell & Kuykendall, Appellate Courts-Facts and Figures, STATE COURT J.,
Spring 1980, at 11. "Filings" as here defined amount to notices of appeal. See id at 34 n.8.
16. Seeid at 11.
17. See id at 14.
18. From 1971 to 1976, filings increased on an average of nine percent per year. Id at
10. There is some indication, however, that the rate of increase may be slowing. See id
19. The proposed amendment states that "[t]he legislature may establish a court of
appeals and provide by law. . . for the manner of review of its decisions by the supreme
court." H.F. 842, 72d Minn. Legis., 1981 Sess. § 1, subd. 2. Note that H.F. 842 contem-
plates the enactment of a statutory provision for discretionary review by the supreme
court of the intermediate court's decisions. See id § 12.
20. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Evolution oState Supreme Courts,
76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 979 (1978).
21. See id at 983-84.
[Vol. 7
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the court to "make new law" through pronouncements that will
have an impact beyond the legal confines of that particular case.
The upper chamber will respond to this importuning. Courts that
exercise a high degree of discretion over the cases they review tend
to write longer opinions that cite more cases and law review arti-
cles,2 2 and have more separate concurrences and dissents.23 These
courts also more often reverse lower court decisions,24 and they
tend, in general, toward a philosophy ofjudicial activism.2 5 Do we
want to encourage this in Minnesota?
These changes wrought by discretionary review are only part of
the pragmatic pig in the judicial poke that we would be buying in
the creation of an intermediate appellate court. An intermediate
court would not necessarily reduce the time from trial court deci-
sion to final disposition. Some of the slowest courts in the nation
are intermediate appellate courts.26 For the many litigants who
seek supreme court review of an intermediate decision, the time
and certainly the expense from trial to final disposition will in-
crease with the addition of another step in the judicial process.
Moreover, there is always Parkinson's Law2 7 to contend with. Par-
kinson's Law states:
Work expands so as to fill the time available for its comple-
tion. General recognition of this fact is shown in the proverbial
phrase "It is the busiest man who has time to spare." Thus, an
elderly lady of leisure can spend the entire day in writing and
dispatching a postcard to her niece at . . . [Mankato or Little
Falls]. An hour will be spent in finding the postcard, another in
hunting for spectacles, half an hour in a search for the address,
an hour and a quarter in composition, and twenty minutes in
deciding whether or not to take an umbrella when going to the
mailbox in the next street. The total effort that would occupy a
busy man for three minutes all told may in this fashion leave
another person prostrate after a day of doubt, anxiety and toil.
Granted that work (and especially paperwork) is thus elastic
in its demands on time, it is manifest that there need be little or
22. See id at 991-93, 997.
23. See id at 997.
24. See id at 995.
25. See id at 1001.
26. See generally Martin & Prescott, State Appellate Courts. The Problems of Delay, STATE
COURT J., Summer 1980, at 9-14, 44-45. The Illinois Appellate Court, First District and
the Indiana Court of Appeals, for example, take more than two years to complete nearly
one-third of their cases. See id at 10.
27. See C. PARKINSON, PARKINSON's LAW (1957).
1981]
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no relationship between the work to be done and the size of the
staff to which it may be assigned. A lack of real activity does
not, of necessity, result in leisure. A lack of occupation is not
necessarily revealed by a manifest idleness. The thing to be
done swells in importance and complexity in a direct ratio with
the time to be spent.
28
There is statistical proof of the validity of Parkinson's Law with
respect to judicial time. The Appellate Justice Improvement Pro-
ject conducted by the National Center for State Courts discovered
that appellate courts with more filings per judge process cases
more quickly than courts with relatively fewer cases per judge.
29
There is another aspect of Parkinson's Law with which we ought
to be concerned, which is the Law of the Rising Pyramid. 30 Imag-
ine an appellate court consisting of a single judge, whom we may
call ABLE, who finds himself overworked. Whether this overwork
is real or imaginary is irrelevant; we may know that ABLE's prob-
lem only results from his own decreasing energy-perhaps a nor-
mal symptom of age. There are only three remedies for this real or
imaginary overwork: (1) ABLE may resign; (2) ABLE may divide
the work with a colleague called BRAVO; or (3) he may enlist the
aid of two assistant judges, whom we may call CITE and DATA.
There is probably no instance in history of ABLE choosing any
but the third alternative. By resignation, all pension rights and
perquisites of office would be lost. The appointment of BRAVO
on the same level would bring in a rival. So ABLE will elect to
have CITE and DATA as his inferiors, thereby adding to his stat-
ure. Further, by dividing the work into two categories as between
CITE and DATA, ABLE will have the merit of being the only one
who comprehends them both. To have CITE as a single assistant
would have been impossible because this would divide the work
with ABLE, and CITE would assume status almost equal to that
which had been refused in the first instance to BRAVO. This sta-
tus is emphasized even more if CITE is ABLE's only successor.
Subordinates must always number two or more. Then, when
CITE complains in turn of being overworked, as he certainly will,
ABLE can, with the wholehearted concurrence of CITE, procure
the appointment of two assistants to him. But ABLE can then
avert internal friction only by advising the appointment of two
28. Id at 2.
29. See Martin & Prescott, supra note 26, at 13.
30. See C. PARKINSON, supra note 27, at 4-7.
[Vol. 7
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more assistants to help DATA, whose position is quite similar to
that of CITE. With the recruitment of E, F, G and H, the tenure
of ABLE is made certain. Seven judges are doing what one did
before. Seven judges now make so much work for each other that
all are fully occupied, and each needs two more assistants.
According to the National Center for State Courts, the Law of
the Rising Pyramid is already manifesting itself in those states that
have intermediate court judges.3 ' In 1966 the National Center
counted 265 intermediate court judges. Even excluding from the
tally judges named to courts created after 1966, the number of
intermediate appellate judges rose to 341 in 1974 and 443 in
1979.32 Adding in the judges of appellate courts created after
1966, the total number of intermediate appellate judges increased
to 415 in 1974 and 583 in 1979.33 Substantial staffs of para-
judges-law clerks and staff attorneys-have accompanied the
new judges and new courts.
3 4
Creation of an intermediate appellate court undoubtedly will
also result in the making of much more judicial law. Proponents
of an intermediate court divide the appellate task into two func-
tions: the reviewing of individual cases for compliance with legal
norms,3 5 and the development of the law for general system-wide
application.3 6 Intermediate courts are readily relegated to per-
formance of the former function.3 7 Sooner or later, however, the
intermediate court will begin "to assist the highest court and legis-
lature in making needed changes in common law doctrine and
statutory provisions."13 8 Our present supreme court makes no apol-
ogy for departing from a doctrine of long standing in the guise of
the "coordination of legal philosophy with . . . new and com-
manding facts . . . in order to satisfy the imperative demand for
realistic judicial treatment of issues in their own actual environ-
ment rather than a synthetic one made from the materials of dis-
31. See Marvell & Kuykendall, supra note 15, at 35.
32. See id
33. See id
34. See id at 37.
35. See ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS
RELATING To APPELLATE COURTS 4 (1977) (Approved Draft) [hereinafter cited as ABA
COMM'N ON STANDARDS]; Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appllate Court, 41 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 459, 460 (1975).
36. &e ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS, supra note 35, at 4.
37. See id
38. Hopkins, supra note 35, at 478.
1981]
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carded doctrine. '39 If this philosophy is implemented by panels of
an intermediate appellate court sitting in uncoordinated divisions
without help from the supreme court, conflicts will abound and
litigation will proliferate, as in the federal system.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO AN INTERMEDIATE COURT MAKE ITS
CREATION UNDESIRABLE
The a..e. p to rcducc the caseload of te supreme court by cre-
ating an intermediate court of appeals and allowing for discretion-
ary review rests upon the premise that not all cases deserve a
decision on the merits rendered by the full supreme court. I have
no quarrel with this basic assumption. No unqualified right of ap-
peal has ever been held to fall within the due process clause of the
United States Constitution,4° nor does our state constitution confer
an individual right of appeal.41 The vast majority of cases in
which the alleged error asserted on appeal turns on a credibility
determination or on the substantiality of the evidence do not merit
much, if any, appellate consideration beyond a motion for a new
trial or judgment n.o.v. directed to the trial court.42 Proponents of
an intermediate court of appeals, however, leap from this premise
to the conclusion that an intermediate court is the proper remedy.
This conclusion ignores a more efficient solution: focusing on the
structure and procedure of the appellate court that we already
have.
In 1973, the National Center for State Courts conducted a study
of the appellate system in Minnesota at the invitation of Chief Jus-
tice Oscar R. Knutson. 43 The study did not consider the creation
of an intermediate appellate court, 44 but instead concentrated on
the changes that could be made in the supreme court to improve
appellate justice in the state. One of its major recommendations
was that the court sit in three-judge, rotating panels45 for all but
the most significant cases. 46 This has never been fully tried or im-
39. Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 187, 296
N.W. 475, 478 (1941).
40. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).
41. See In re O'Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 220 N.W.2d 811 (1974).
42. See id at 167 n.7, 220 N.W.2d at 817 n.7.
43. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STUDY OF THE APPELLATE SYS-
TEM IN MINNESOTA (1974) [hereinafter cited as NCSC STUDY].
44. See id at 44.
45. See id at 41.
46. See id at 32.
[Vol. 7
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plemented.
There are several advantages to a properly instituted panel sys-
tem. The use of panels reduces the number of times each justice
must sit during the term, thereby freeing up additional days for
thinking, writing opinions, or involvement in other matters.4 7 It
also may mean that each justice will have fewer cases to consider.
While the number of majority opinions each justice would write
would remain approximately the same as if all cases were heard en
banc,48 a justice would have much more time to work on each
opinion because there would be fewer opinions of others to review.
Continuing the practice of having retired justices or appointed dis-
trict court judges sit as visiting members would further alleviate
the burden on full-time members of the court.
49
The court's use of the panel system to date has been far from
complete. Sitting in panels for argument but delivering opinions
ostensibly en banc does not take full advantage of the economics of
the use of panels.-5 In the average case, in which no new trails are
blazed through legal thickets, there is no need to circulate an opin-
ion for the approval of each active member of the court. Such en
banc approval need only be sought in cases in which a screening
device smokes out those panel decisions that affect the holding of a
prior decision or make new law.
5'
The objection is occasionally made that supreme courts should
47. The 1973 study estimated that, based on the then seven-member court, sitting in
panels of three would provide up to 48 additional workdays per justice per year. Id at 29.
Leflar states that "[i]f a seven-judge court sat in two panels instead of one. . . experience
has proved that it can increase [its] output at least by half." R. LEFLAR, .supra note 4, at
67.
48. This is presuming that opinion assignments are made to the extent possible with
an eye toward having each justice responsible for about the same number of majority
opinions.
49. Under the Minnesota Constitution, district court judges "may be assigned tempo-
rarily to act as judges of the supreme court upon its request." MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
The legislature also has provided that the supreme court "may by rule assign temporarily
any retired justice of the supreme court or one district court judge at a time to act as a
justice of the supreme court." MINN. STAT. § 2.724(2) (1980). The court may also ap-
point any resigned justice to act as a commissioner of the supreme court to assist the court
in any of its duties. See MINN. STAT. §§ 480.21(1), 490.025(5) (1980).
50. I recognize that there is some question whether a panel of three will meet the
statement in State ex reZ R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 38
Minn. 281, 37 N.W. 782 (1888), re'dan oder ground, 134 U.S. 418 (1890): "The supreme
court. . . can exercise its judicial functions only when a quorum is present." 38 Minn. at
294, 37 N.W. at 784. A constitutional amendment providing for three-judge panels may
be required. At worst, panels of five could sit, but this would not achieve the same effi-
ciency of operation.
51. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to cite one example,
1981]
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sit only en banc, 52 but former Justice Leflar's response to that criti-
cism is sound:
If it be objected that cases serious enough to be appealed
should be tried by the whole court, the alternative of appeal to
an intermediate court ought to be kept in mind. In the inter-
mediate courts of nearly all the states that have them, the bulk
of the cases are heard by three-judge panels. In the federal
courts, of course, there are en banc hearings at the intermediate
leve . This could happen in state istermediate courts too, but it
seldom does. In any event, only a limited number of cases will
reach the highest court. In general, these will be the same cases
that, because of their importance, would be reserved for en
banc consideration by the entire court if there were no interme-
diate court and the top court sat in divisions. The point is this:
cases that would be decided by divisions of the top court are the
same ones that would be heard by an equally small or smaller
number of judges in an intermediate court; cases that would be
left for en banc hearing in the top court would be the ones sent
up to the top court if there were an intermediate court.
53
Using panels in this fashion allows the benefits of an intermedi-
ate court of appeals without the burdens of its creation. There
would still be, for example, a method for screening cases before
they were heard by the entire supreme court. Decisions of panels
could be appealed by petition for rehearing with a suggestion for a
rehearing en banc; a suggestion that the en banc court would be
free to reject if sufficient members saw no merit to it. Conflicts
regularly sits in panels and utilizes this system of referral to the active members of the
court:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between
or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the
active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear in
banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted. In the discretion of the
panel, a proposed opinion which would establish a new rule of procedure may be
similarly circulated before it is issued. When the position is adopted by the panel
after compliance with this procedure, the opinion, when published, shall contain
a footnote worded, depending on the circumstances, in substance as follows:
This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court in regu-
lar active service. (No judge favored, or a majority did not favor) a
rehearing in banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe).
7TH CIR. R. 16(e). I note further, as an aside, that reference to federal appellate courts is
not inapposite. The Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee had as its "object
. . . that procedure in the Minnesota Supreme Court may come as near to that prescribed
for the U.S. Court of Appeals as is feasible." MINN. R. Civ. App. P., Preliminary Com-
ment.
52. See ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS, suepra note 35, at 7-9.
53. R. LEFLAR, supra note 4, at 67-68.
[Vol. 7
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between panels could be minimized by a rule incorporating some
full court reference procedure, as discussed above,54 and the possi-
bility of an en banc rehearing would provide a safety valve. On
those important cases which the court decided to rehear en banc, it
would not only have the benefit of an opinion from the panel, 55 it
would have the additional benefit of the actual participation, both
at oral argument and in conference, of those justices who heard the
appeal the first time.
The use of panels also increases the utility of another possible
response to the caseload problem: the addition ofjudges. When a
court sits en banc, an additional member may lighten the per-
judge opinion load slightly, but his or her presence will not affect
the number of cases each judge must sit on and prepare for. Thus,
merely adding more judges to an en banc court "without making
structural or procedural changes will not automatically guarantee
that processing time will be substantially reduced." 56 But in a
court that hears many of its cases in rotating, three-judge panels,
the addition of judges reduces cases per judge and sittings per
judge, as well as the per-judge opinion load. Of course, this same
effect is augmented when a judge is appointed on a temporary or
visiting basis, and this makes available the effective option of deal-
ing with backlog ,on a short-term basis by temporarily increasing
the membership of the court.57 If, after the panel system is fully
operational, it becomes apparent that more judges are needed, ad-
ding them and their staffs to an existing court will be more effi-
cient and less costly than creating a separate court, with its own
largely duplicative bureaucracy. 58
54. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
55. This benefit alone, however, would not be sufficient to justify creation of another
tier of review:
It is true that the intermediate argument and decision that would serve as a
preview might be attractive to judges on state supreme courts and induce some
of them to encourage the creation of intermediate courts. The fact remains,
however, that such a preliminary to the top-court hearing, however helpful, does
not justify the delay, the extra expense to the parties of an intervening proce-
dure, and the cost to the taxpayers of maintaining or enlarging an intermediate
court to take care of the protracted litigation.
R. LEFLAR, supra note 4, at 75.
56. Martin & Prescott, supra note 26, at 13.
57. These temporary additional members could serve in the posture of visiting district
court judges, sitting on panels but not participating in en banc decisions. In this way, the
membership of an en banc court could be kept at nine for more efficient en bane process-
ing, and for the traditionalists who are against a larger court.
58. I would think it possible to add as many as 18 judges to the present court, if such
a radical move became necessary, and yet keep the size of the en bane court at nine. For
19811
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Efficiency also would be increased by changes more procedural
in nature than the above suggestions for internal structural reform.
Cases can be more effectively screened and processed. For exam-
ple, the supreme court need not entertain every appeal that is
filed. If the court is overburdened with frivolous appeals or unim-
portant cases, the justices have the power to correct these
problems. Rule 103.04 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure states that the supreme court can take any action that
the interests of justice may require in an appeal.- Under this
power, the justices can simply say: "Appeal denied." 6 Although
the court has held that a legislative regulation of appeals does not
violate the Minnesota Constitution,61 it has ruled that this is but a
matter of "comity," and that nothing prevents it from keeping the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction entirely within its own control.
62
If one reason for the overwork is the supposed need to review and
decide unimportant matters with little monetary, precedential, or
human value, I suggest that the need is self-imposed and can be
eliminated.
Of those cases that survive the initial screening for frivolity,
many could be disposed of on the briefs alone without oral argu-
ment.63 These could be assigned to panels, as would the vast ma-
jority of all argued cases. Those few cases of such significance to
merit an en banc decision immediately could be so designated.
This Article is not the place to recommend the criteria for selec-
tion, but I would think a case would have to be important indeed
most of its cases, the court would sit in panels of three, with one member of the en banc
court sitting with two judges who would sit only on panels. Creation of such an intermedi-
ate bench wzthin the present court structure may well be the wave of the future. See notes
76-77 infta and accompanying text.
59. "The Supreme Court upon an appeal may reverse, affirm, or modify the judg-
ment or order appealed from, or take any other action as the interests of justice may
require." MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04(1).
60. See id 133.01(1), 136.01(2). Note, however, that extensive use of this power could
have some of the same "side effects" discussed earlier. See notes 21-25 supra and accompa-
nying text.
61. Set Smith v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 224 Minn. 52, 68 N.W.2d 638 (1955); Holmes v.
Campbell, 12 Minn. 221, 12 Gil. 141 (1867); Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166, 9 Gil. 153
(1864).
62. See State v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam); State v. Wingo,
266 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1978); In re O'Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 220 N.W.2d 811 (1974).
63. Cf MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 134.07, 135 (providing for "nonoral" consideration of
some cases by panels). Note the recent date of the amendment of these rules. Order
Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Finance and Com-
merce, Dec. 12, 1980, at 12, col. 2.
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to bypass the normal panel process. The present rules need only a
little fine tuning, not a new court.
Furthermore, our supreme court could well go further than it
has in abandoning essay writing. Twelve years ago I recom-
mended that the supreme court ameliorate the difficulty of opin-
ion writing by simply stopping. There was then, and is now, no
requirement of written opinions. A statute6 requires the court to
"give its decision in writing,' '65 but nothing in the law obliges the
court to write out an opinion or give its reasons, even if the legisla-
ture had any business telling it to do so. The supreme court has
said many times that it need not detail what the evidence is in any
appeal in which the question is principally one of facts and the
facts support the decision or verdict below.6 The court, however,
does not always heed its own pronouncements. In Caroga Realy Co.
v. Tapper,67 for example, although the court said, after five pages of
history, that it was not within its province "to go into an extended
discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness
of the findings of the trial court," 68 it went on for ten more pages
of exactly such an extended discussion, 69 including two special
concurrences.7
0
As long ago as 1865, 71 the supreme court told the Minnesota
Senate that the court would not act as the senate's adviser. 72 The
supreme court does not have to be the unnecessary adviser of law-
64. MINN. STAT. § 480.06 (1980).
65. The statute provides:
In all cases decided by the court, it shall give its decision in writing, and file
the same with the clerk, together with headnotes, briefly stating the points de-
cided. A copy ofsuch headnotes shall be furnished by the clerk, without charge,
to such proprietors of daily newspapers as may desire them for free publication.
Decisions may be rendered and judgments entered thereon in vacation as well as
in term.
Id
66. See Dempsey v. Meighen, 251 Minn. 562, 572, 90 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1958). The
court stated:
In discussing the question of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, it is
unnecessary to further detail the evidence in order to demonstrate the absolute
correctness of the trial court's findings of fact. . . . This court's duty is per-
formed when it has considered all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court's findings and has determined whether the findings are reason-
ably sustained by the evidence as a whole.
Id (citations omitted).
67. 274 Minn. 164, 143 N.W.2d 215 (1966).
68. Id at 170, 143 N.W.2d at 220.
69. See id at 170-80, 143 N.W.2d at 220-26.
70. See id at 180, 143 N.W.2d at 226.
71. See In re Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78, 10 Gil. 56 (1865).
72. See id at 81, 10 Gil. at 58.
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yers or the public in 1981 or beyond. Where a per curiam opinion
will do, there is no need to draft an extended opinion in the grand
style. The average length of opinions has increased during the
twentieth century, 73 and on the whole, this is regrettable and un-
necessary. "If I had more time," the saying goes, "I'd have written
a shorter letter." The supreme court should be given more pro-
ductive hours by having more judges on the same court and by
making better use of panels and screening devices.
IV. CONCLUSION
In short, if a change in the appellate system is necessary, there
are ways to achieve the benefits of an intermediate court of ap-
peals without the burdens of its creation. In the past, Minnesota
has been a leader in appellate improvements. 74 Rather than un-
questioningly following those states that in recent years have
jumped on the intermediate court bandwagon, 75 Minnesota
should continue to be the band leader. Reforms that use the pres-
ent trial/appellate structure, rather than being reactionary, are in
fact forward-looking. Back in 1967, the American Judicature Soci-
ety published an editorial that seemed to me historic. 76 Without
assessing cause and effect, the editorial agreed that the number of
judges must increase as the volume of judicial work increases. But
the editor asked, as I think we must, "Why another court . . .
The editorial contained its own answer. It said:
We predict that one day the Model Judicial Article will be
revised to provide for a two-level judicial structure-a single
state-wide Court of Justice with a unified trial division which
may be referred to in those very words as the Trial Division,
and a unified appellate division which may be known as the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or simply as the Appel-
late Division of the Court of Justice. . . . The Appellate Divi-
sion will be divided into as many three-judge panels as the
volume of appellate work requires, and these will sit at such
times and places as convenience and efficiency dictate ...
All appeals will be filed in the one Appellate Division and ad-
73. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, supra note 20, at 991 n.71.
74. See NCSC STUDY, upra note 43, at 1 (referring to supreme court's use of adminis-
trator and commissioners).
75. At present, 33 states have created intermediate courts, most rather recently. In
1911, intermediate courts existed in 13 states, and that number did not change until 1957.
Eight such courts were created in the 1970's. See Marvell & Kuykendall, supra note 15, at
11.
76. The Caue for a Two-Level State Court System, 50 JUDICATURE 185 (1967).
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ministratively assigned to the individual appellate panel which
can most advantageously handle them. The resolving or
preventing of conflicting decisions by different panels within
the court will be worked out under administrative rules, per-
haps by means of a hearing before a seven-man tribunal con-
sisting of two three-man panels and the presiding judge.
Selected cases of great public importance might be similarly
heard, but no litigant will have a right to a hearing before more
than three judges, nor to a second appeal.
Even states that are not working on judicial reorganization
are no longer establishing new trial courts to cope with trial
court backlogs. They are adding more judges to existing trial
courts. Why, then, is this out-moded device still the standard
remedy for congestion in our courts of last resort, and whose
interests does it serve?
Not the litigants. Details ofjudicial organization and admin-
istration are of no concern to them as long as their cases are
heard promptly and decided fairly, and if there is a question
about the latter point, they want that question resolved
promptly and fairly. This the two-level court system is well
equipped to do. There is a psychological benefit in having
every appellate decision handed down by and in the name of
the court of last resort, so that no litigant need ever be told,
"Sorry, your case isn't big or important enough to be heard by
the Supreme Court. .... "
Not the lawyers. They certainly have no professional interest
in arguing cases in an intermediate court rather than the court
of last resort. They may have a short-range financial interest in
the additional practice that double appeals occasionally pro-
vide, but in the long run the lawyer's best interest, like the liti-
gant's, is in getting each case heard, decided, closed and paid
for, and moving on to the next one. Decisions of an intermedi-
ate court are of doubtful value as precedents, and in a two-level
court system there would be none.
Not the judges. Some present supreme court judges might,
indeed, look askance upon the dilution of their power and pres-
tige that might be thought to follow if they were to be one of a
dozen or 15 judges of equal rank rather than one of seven or
nine at the top of the heap. This would be offset by the higher
status that would be given to those who would otherwise be
only intermediate appellate judges. However, considerations of
personal prestige and status are really not worthy of very much
of anybody's attention or concern, and the important thing is
that the judges would benefit as much as anybody from having
a simplified and efficient judicial organization.
1961]
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Certainly least of all the taxpayers. Even though the number
of judges is the same, if they work in one court instead of two,
there is only one court's administrative and clerical staff, and
the second court staff is one the taxpayers will be glad to do
without. With the natural trend in government constantly to-
ward increased complexity, more employees and more expense,
a move toward simplification, economy and efficiency in one
branch of government cannot fail to be welcomed."
7
The case is madeagians/ creating a new court of appeals r.,o
more efficient and effective use of our present appellate system.
That is what those Kansas lawyers voted for at the turn of the
century. That is what I would vote for now. The very latest data
from the American Judicature Society warns us to beware:
"'[C]ourt systems are like highways . . . the more we build, the
busier they are.' ",78
77. Id at 186-87.
78. Flango & Blair, Creating an intermediale appellate court.- does it reduce the caseload of a
state's highest court?, 64 JUDICATURE 75, 77 (1980) (brackets in original).
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